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This paper is aimed to develop a model of the sign as homomorphism (i.e. similarity of form) as the initial 
part of a strict and fundamental theory of sign. Many various signs—photographs, pictures, sculptures, 
diagrams, surface maps, etc.—might be viewed in terms of homomorphism. The proposed model of sign 
as a homomorphism is derived using Aristotle’s theory of being. Two principles of Aristotle’s theory—form 
and matter—are used as elementary ideas in the model of sign. The main peculiarity of the undertaken 
approach to semiotics is treating a sign and a signified object as derivative ideas; they are constructed as 
compounds of form and matter. To achieve more strictness, the model of sign is treated in terms of the 
system of Cartesian coordinates modified for the articulation of being. Intentionality is viewed as the key 
idea in the model of sign. The approach to the definition of sign presented in this paper can be viewed as 
an ontological alternative to Peirce’s one. 
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1. Introduction
Greeks used the name semeiotike to denote 
the science of medical signs—symptoms. 
Philosophers—including Plato and Aris-
totle—viewed the idea of sign in a wider 
context.	Sign	studies	were	a	field	of	inter-
est also for the medieval and renaissance 
philosophers. locke	in	1690	cardinally	ex-
tended their scope. In his Essay concern-
ing human understanding, locke divided 
science into three sorts—physica, practi-
ca, and semiotike—according	to	the	“most	
general division of the objects of our un-
derstanding”.	He	viewed	semiotics	as	 the 
doctrine of signs	 and	 noted:	 “It	 is	 aptly	
enough termed also logike,	logic”.	Its	task	
was	 “to	 consider	 the	 nature	 of	 signs,	 the	
mind makes use of for the understanding 
of things, or conveying its knowledge to 
others”.	 Signs	 are	 necessary	 “to	 commu-
nicate our thoughts to one another, as well 
as	to	record	them	for	our	own	use”,	Locke	
claimed. 
locke’s semiotics took several forms 
during the last centuries. As logic, it be-
came	a	flourishing	domain	of	knowledge.	
114
One of its branch—formal logic—made 
a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 the	 informa-
tion revolution in the twentieth century. 
Charles Sanders Peirce in the beginning 
of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 changed	 signifi-
cantly the shape of semiotics by proposing 
a philosophical account of the sign, based 
on the universal categories of being. He 
preserved locke’s idea to relate semiot-
ics with logic. Ferdinand de Saussure, al-
most at the same time, proposed a different 
approach to the study of signs, which he 
termed semiology. It became very popu-
lar among linguists, anthropologists and 
other researchers of various domains of 
humanities. the scope of semiology was 
limited to language and its social environ-
ment.	Saussure’s	approach	differs	signifi-
cantly from that of locke and Peirce; in 
particular, it does not include logic as its 
ingredient part; it is related to logic only to 
the	extent	the	language	is	related	to	logic.	
Saussure did not use the powerful methods 
developed in logic. 
the scope of research in modern se-
miotics	 ranges	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 its	
elementary ideas—including the idea of 
sign—to semiotic accounts of mental, so-
cial, cultural, political, and even computa-
tional phenomena.
In the middle of the twentieth century, 
semiotics became very popular in aca-
demic circles. the interest was provoked 
mainly	 by	 the	 need	 and	 expectation	 to	
find	methodological	 tools	 for	humanities;	
earlier, Dilthey	 (1889)	 related	 a	 similar	
hope to hermeneutics—the theory of in-
terpretation.	 The	 expectations,	 however,	
mostly failed; semiotics did not become a 
methodology for humanities. 
Strict and precise methods are rarely 
used in semiotics. Some authors borrow 
tools from logic. Greimas	 (1970),	 in	par-
ticular, employed the square of opposi-
tions	 (the	 Boethian	 square)—a	 classical	
tool in logic. Other simple means of logic 
are applied for a semiotic interpretation 
of	texts.	Peirce also used ideas of logic in 
his	classification	of	signs.	Overall,	semiot-
ics actually still does not possess its own 
unique methods. 
the current situation in semiotics 
might be evaluated viewing it from at least 
two different perspectives: as a domain of 
humanities and as a science. Philosophy 
should be mentioned separately. Semiotics 
as a philosophical study of signs has ac-
cumulated many interesting ideas during 
its long history. the current state of semi-
otics, from this perspective, is similar to 
many other directions in philosophy. the 
situation of semiotics as a domain of hu-
manities, if compared with such domains 
as linguistics, anthropology, various cul-
tural	studies,	might	seem	even	a	flourish-
ing domain of knowledge.
the evaluation of semiotics in terms of 
science, however, is not very optimistic. 
Semiotics as logic (according to locke) to-
day is certainly a well-developed science. 
Its rest part—what is called semiotics in its 
contemporary sense—should be analyzed 
in more detail. 
locke	 placed	 semiotics	 next	 to	 phys-
ics, what implied their implicit compari-
son as two sciences. Physics was already a 
rather well-established science in the times 
of locke; semiotics, however, was actu-
ally only a domain of philosophy. today, 
the gap between physics and semiotics as 
two sciences is much wider: in fact, it is an 
abyss. Modern semiotics is a very young 
domain of knowledge. even its name is 
not widely known beyond the academic 
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circles. Deely	(2004)	in	the	preface	of	his	
book has noted Basics of Semiotics:	“The	
image of the modern semiotic universe is 
the	 same	 as	 that	 of	 astronomy	 in	 1611”.	
We should admit that semiotics, despite 
its long prehistory, still lacks a strict theo-
retical ground similar to the one used in 
sciences. Only fragmentary, non-interre-
lated	theories	exist.	Semiotics	still	has	not	
reached the state when knowledge is being 
accumulated continuously to form a solid 
system of facts and theories. In terms of 
Kuhn (1962), it did not reach the state of a 
normal science.	Locke’s	 idea—rather	ex-
pectation—to view semiotics as important 
as	physics	is	far	from	fulfilment.	
this paper is aimed to contribute to de-
veloping the theory of sign. the concrete 
purpose is to make a little step in this direc-
tion and to develop a model of the sign as 
a homomorphism (i.e. similarity of form) 
as the initial part of a strict and fundamen-
tal theory of sign. 
Many various signs—images, pho-
tographs, pictures, sculptures, diagrams, 
graphical schemes, surface maps, city 
plans, etc.—may be viewed in terms of 
homomorphism. therefore, developing 
a model of sign as a homomorphism is 
an important task. Ambrosio (2010) has 
claimed that Peirce’s icon might be viewed 
as a homomorphism. 
the main object of this paper, hence, 
is the sign as a homomorphism, or, more 
precisely, an ontologically defined sign as 
a homomorphism. 
the approach of this paper aims to 
ground the account of sign in the theory of 
being and, in particular, to base the sign on 
the insights into Aristotle’s theory—hylo-
morphism. the theory of being, however, 
is a domain of philosophy, and it does not 
provide precise methods for the analysis of 
sign. therefore, for more strictness, also 
the idea of the Cartesian coordinates is 
employed. the latter is implicitly based in 
logic; therefore, in fact, I use the methods 
of logic. I adapt the Cartesian system for 
the articulation of being treated in terms of 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism. the peculiar-
ity of my approach from the point of view 
of semiotics is in viewing the basic semi-
otic	 concepts—the	 sign	 and	 the	 signified	
object—as derivative ideas; traditionally, 
they are viewed as primary ideas. the two 
elementary ideas from Aristotle’s theory of 
being—form and matter (or content)—are 
used as primary ideas instead. the ideas of 
the	signified	object	and	sign	are	derived	on	
their ground. Models of other related semi-
otic phenomena may also be derived using 
this approach. 
A short remark on the interpretation of 
the	 classical	 texts	 analyzed	 in	 this	 paper	
should	be	added.	Texts	of	Aristotle, Aqui-
nas,	Bonaventura	and	some	other	authors	
are used here. the purpose, however, is 
not the analysis and interpretation of these 
texts.	The	purpose	 is	 to	propose	a	 theory	
of sign, inspired by the insights into the 
classical	 texts;	 therefore,	 in	 some	 places	
I purposefully deviate from their ideas. 
the problem of the interpretation of clas-
sical	 texts	 is	 considered	 in	 hermeneutics.	 
the reader’s intention might differ from 
that of the author; interpretation, therefore, 
might also differ. 
the paper consists of nine chapters: in-
troduction (Chapter 1), an overview of the 
conceptions of sign (Chapter 2), analysis 
and grounding of the approach (Chapter 3), 
derivation of the model of sign as a homo-
morphism	(Chapters	4—7),	description	of	
the relation of sign as a homomorphism to 
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Peirce’s	 conception	 of	 sign	 (Chapter	 8),	
and conclusions (Chapter 9). 
The	 text	 and	 the	 reference	 list	 of	 the	
paper are aimed to be compliant with the 
rules of the APA Publication Style.
2. sign Idea and Being
logically, semiotics should start from the 
account of sign as its primary idea. Sign is 
a	complex	phenomenon;	 therefore,	 in	 the	
history of semiotics, there were various 
approaches	 to	 its	 explanation.	 Theories	
of sign make the most elaborated part of 
the modern semiotics. In this chapter, the 
main conceptions of sign are analyzed in 
relation to the ontological approach of this 
paper. Peirce’s ideas are described sepa-
rately in more detail, because his approach 
is closest to that of this paper.
The	terms	defining	the	situation	of	sign	
should	be	defined	first.
2.1. Defining the Sign
the situation of sign (and the sequence of 
sign correlates) is often presented as fol-
lows:	a)	signifier,	b)	signified,	c)	referent.	
unfortunately, as eco	 (1988)	 and	Hébert 
(2006) have noticed, there is no full agree-
ment on this subject. One of the problems 
is related to the treatment of the signified. 
Although most often it is treated as the 
signified meaning or the signified concept, 
some authors view it as the signified ob-
ject, i.e. as a referent. Peirce used the term 
signified in relation to object. 
the confusion of terms possibly 
emerged due to different positions of au-
thors. there are two basic positions in 
modern semiotics: the view of linguistics 
(or literary, cultural, e.g. that, of Saussure) 
and the view of logic (or the general theory 
of signs, e.g., that of Peirce). In the lin-
guistic tradition, the concept is the signi-
fied.	From	 the	point	of	view	of	 the	 logic	
(Peirce’s tradition), the object is the signi-
fied. the meaning in the latter case is treat-
ed as a separate component of the sign: the 
interpretant. It should be added that ac-
cording to Peirce, sign refers to its object; 
the object, therefore, could be viewed as a 
referent.
to avoid the confusion of terms and to 
combine both positions, I suggest using 
the	term	“signified”	only	as	an	adjective	in	
a phrase: the signified meaning, signified 
concept, signified object, etc. In this paper, 
I will mostly use the term signified object. 
2.2. Approaches
A detailed overview of the models and def-
initions	of	sign	provide,	for	example,	Nöth 
(1995)	in	his	extensive	Handbook of Semi-
otics and Sebeok	(1986)	in	the	Encyclope-
dic Dictionary of Semiotics. In the present 
paper, sign is viewed in relation to being; 
therefore, different conceptions of sign 
will be evaluated in this respect. Accord-
ing to the approach of this paper, I should 
start from Aristotle1. 
Aristotle considered sign in On Inter-
pretation shortly: 
“Spoken	 words	 are	 symbols	 of	 mental	
experience,	and	written	words	are	symbols	
of spoken words. Just as all men have not the 
same writing, so all men have not the same 
speech	sounds,	but	 the	mental	 experiences,	
which these directly symbolize, are the same 
for all, as also are the things of which our 
experiences	are	the	images“	(I,	1).
1 Several sources for quotations from Aristotle are 
used in this paper. they all are provided in the list of 
references. A source can be determined according to the 
title of the essay.
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Indirectly, the above quotation might 
be treated as Aristotle’s conception of sign. 
It presents a blend of physical (the things 
of which our experiences are the images) 
and mental (mental experiences) being. 
this quotation in modern semiotics is of-
ten viewed as the description of the triadic 
model of sign. Aristotle did not treat sign 
in terms of being directly. Overall, he did 
not	contribute	significantly	to	semiotics.
Poinsot directly viewed sign in terms 
of being. In his Tractatus de signis (Deely 
and Powell,	 1985),	 he	 viewed	 sign	 as	 a	
special mode of being. Sign depends on 
something else; therefore, it is a relational 
being. to put it in other terms, sign is an 
intentional being. Many other representa-
tives of medieval and modern semiotics 
claimed that sign stands for something 
else, and thus they admitted that sign is a 
relational being. 
In modern semiotics, two basic concep-
tions of sign—Saussure’s and Peirce’s—
are considered most often. F. de Saussure 
(1916/1972)	viewed	signs	in	terms	of	lin-
guistics; therefore, there were no place for 
the	physical	signified	objects	in	his	model.	
Convention was a basis relating the sig-
nifier	 and	 the	 signified	 concept;	 this	was	
a peculiarity of Saussure’s approach. It 
might be noted that Saussure actually only 
reintroduced the ideas known already from 
antiquity. Already Plato noticed that names 
are conventional signs in Cratylus:	“I	(…)	
cannot convince myself that there is any 
principle of correctness in names other 
than	 convention	 and	 agreement”.	 Part	
of the above Aristotle’s quotation corre-
sponds	to	Saussure’s	idea	of	sign:	“Spoken	
words	are	symbols	of	mental	experience...”	
(On Interpretation, I, 1). An important pe-
culiarity of Saussure’s sign is its relation 
to being: a sign (both its components) is a 
mental being. It should be noted, however, 
that Saussure did not ground his account of 
sign in being. 
Peirce, the founder of semiotics of the 
twentieth century, proposed a very original 
theory of sign. I describe Peirce’s model in 
the	next	section	separately	in	more	detail.	
Behaviorists	 presented	 a	 cardinally	
different	 tradition	 in	 defining	 sign.	 They	
attempted	to	externalize	the	sign	and	ana-
lyzed it in empirical terms. Morris, for 
example,	gave	the	following	definition	of	
sign:
If A is a preparatory-stimulus that, in 
the absence of stimulus objects initiating 
response-sequences of a certain behavior-
family, causes in some organism a disposi-
tion to respond by response-sequences of 
this behavior-family, then A is a sign (Mor-
ris,	1946/1971,	pp.	105—106).
The	 definition	 is	 based	 on	 the	 classi-
cal scheme of stimulus and response (or, 
action and reaction, more generally) com-
mon to behaviorism. George H. Mead 
started in 1922 the behaviorist tradition in 
his paper A behaviorist account of the sig-
nificant symbol. 
Jakob	von	Uexküll	extended	the	behav-
iorist	approach	to	the	definition	of	sign	in	
his Theory of Meaning (Bedeutungslehre)	
(1982/1940).	He	viewed	 sign	 in	 terms	of	
the functional circle which relates organ-
ism to its environment (Umwelt). the 
functional circle might be treated in terms 
of the action and reaction scheme. 
Behaviorists	 introduced	 an	 entirely	
new branch to the theory of sign; its im-
portance, therefore, is even greater than 
the one of Peirce, which only continued 
the mentalist tradition in semiotics. the 
behaviorist approach—as a direction in 
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psychology—tended to ignore the internal 
(mental)	 being.	 Behaviorists’s	 models	 of	
sign, therefore, also had this peculiarity; 
this was a kind of opposition to the Sau-
ssure’s and Peirce’s models. It might be 
noted,	however,	 that	Uexküll’s functional 
circle, applied to umwelt of the human or-
ganism, might include both internal (men-
tal)	and	external	(physical)	being.	
Klinkenberg (1996, as cited in Hébert, 
2006) proposed a four-component model 
consisting	of	the	stimulus,	signifier,	signi-
fied,	and	referent.	He	described	stimulus	as	
“...	the	perceptible	physical	element	(e.g.,	
a sound) that serves as the substrate in 
which	the	signifier	is	manifested”	(Hébert,	
2006).
Hébert	 (2006)	 further	 extended	 Klin-
kenberg’s model and described an even 
more	detailed	(six-component)	speculative	
model of sign:
“The	main	terms	that	enter	into	the	defi-
nition of the sign are the following: (1) the 
stimulus (the physical signal being used, 
such	as	a	vocal	sound),	(2)	the	signifier	(the	
model, e.g., a phoneme, of which the stimu-
lus	is	a	manifestation),	(3)	the	signified	(the	
meaning or content of the sign), the concept 
(the	mental	representation	of	the	signified),	
which	is	either	(4)	logical	or	(5)	psychologi-
cal, and (6) the referent (what we are talk-
ing about when we use a particular sign) 
(Hébert, 2006, para. 1).
the conceptions of sign proposed 
by Klinkenberg and Hébert presented a 
mixed	 perspective	 of	 sign	 in	 relation	 to	
being: the stimulus was a physical being, 
and	 the	signified	meaning	(concept)	was	
a mental being.
the following conclusions might be 
drawn to summarize this short overview 
of the conceptions of sign. Currently, 
there	 exist	 several	 basic	 conceptions	 of	
sign. Hence, semioticians acknowledge the 
complexity	of	the	idea	of	sign.	Some	con-
ceptions differ entirely, e.g., the behaviorist 
one;	 others	 have	 a	 certain	 similarity.	 Be-
havioral and mentalist (cognitive) concep-
tions make a certain opposition. None of 
the considered conceptions of sign includes 
all the rest. It should also be concluded that 
none of the proposed conceptions of sign 
has	resulted	in	developing	a	strict	scientific	
theory of sign. Peirce proposed the most 
profound theory and grounded it in being. 
According to the approach of this paper, the 
idea of sign is also grounded in the theory 
of being; therefore, his approach should be 
analyzed in more detail. 
2.3. Peirce’s Conception of Sign
2.3.1. Approach to Being
Peirce viewed being from the perspective 
of	 subjective	 experience	 and	 treated	 it	 in	
terms of universal categories. He intro-
duced the categories in his paper On a New 
List of Categories	 (1984)	 after	 analyzing	
several other philosophical systems, in-
cluding those of Kant and Aristotle. Hoff-
mann (2001) described Peirce’s categories 
as follows: 
“For	 Peirce, categories are not, as for 
Aristotle,	 “modes	of	proposition,”	but	phe-
nomenological modes. the three categories 
designate all possible modes something may 
appear to us. thus, they are absolutely basic 
for Peirce’s epistemology and his semiotics 
as well. to avoid misunderstandings, Peirce 
names	 his	 categories	 simply	 “Firstness,”	
“Secondness,”	and	“Thirdness.”	Something	
may	appear	to	us	either	as	a	“First,	a	“Sec-
ond,”	or	a	“Third”,	there	is	no	other	possibil-
ity (Hoffmann, 2001, para. 9).
The	 experience	 of	 reality	 for	 Peirce 
begins from Firstness considered only in 
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respect to the ground	which	 is	“...	a	pure	
abstraction, reference to which constitutes 
a quality	 or	 general	 attribute	 ...”	 (Peirce,	
1984).	He	related	the	Secondness	and	the	
thirdness accordingly to the correlate and 
the interpretant. the correlate is an equiv-
alent of other:	“An	other is plainly equiva-
lent to a correlate”	(ibid.);	“... interpretant 
(...)	fulfils	the	office	of	an	interpreter,	who	
says that a foreigner says the same thing 
which	he	himself	says”	 (ibid.).	There	ex-
ists a strict order among categories as their 
numerical	 names	 indicate	 and	 “no	 one	
of the categories can be prescinded from 
those	above	it”	(ibid.).	To	summarize,	the	
categories were presented as follows: 
Firstness is a reference to a ground, 
Secondness is a reference to a correlate, 
and
thirdness is a reference to an interpre-
tant.
Peirce used also other names for the 
categories, in particular, quality for First-
ness, relation for Secondness, and repre-
sentation for thirdness. the categories, 
nevertheless,	 remained	 difficult	 to	 under-
stand for his contemporaries and followers 
because	of	their	extreme	generality.	
2.3.2. Definition of Sign
Peirce related sign with the idea of thing: 
“There	are	three	kinds	of	interest	we	may	
take in a thing. First, we may have a primary 
interest in it for itself. Second, we may have 
a secondary interest in it, on account of its 
reactions with other things. third, we may 
have a mediatory interest in it, in so far as it 
conveys to a mind an idea about a thing. In 
so far as it does this, it is a sign, or represen-
tation (Peirce,	1998,	para.	2).
Peirce placed sign in the framework of 
being by viewing it as a category of third-
ness.	More	specifically,	he	presented	sign	
as	 a	 “triple	 connection	 of	 sign,	 a	 thing	
signified,	 and	 cognition	 produced	 in	 the	
mind”	 (Peirce,	 1984,	Vol.	 1,	 p.	 372).	He	
also often used other names for the sign 
components: representamen for sign, ob-
ject	for	the	thing	signified,	and	interpretant 
for cognition produced in the mind; the lat-
ter now is often treated as meaning.
Graphically, the Peirce model of sign may 
be presented as a triangle (see Figure 1). 
Peirce has noted, however, that a trian-
gle	does	not	express	fully	the	idea	of	sign	
as thirdness. It gives only its dyadically 
degenerated image. 
Marty	 (1997)	 has	 collected	 and	 ana-
lyzed	 76	 definitions	 of	 sign	 in	 Peirce’s 
writings. Nöth	 (1995,	 p.	 42)	 singled	 out	
the	following	definition	as	the	more	elabo-
rated one: 
“A	sign,	or	representamen,	is	something	
which stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity. It addresses some-
body, that is, creates in the mind of that per-
son an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more 
developed sign. that sign which it creates I 
call	the	interpretant	of	the	first	sign.	The	sign	
stands for something, its object. It stands for 
that object, not in all respects, but in refer-
ence to a sort of idea (Peirce, 1931, Vol. 2, 
§	228).	
Figure 1. Graphical presentation of Peirce’s 
model of sign
ObjectRepresentamen
Interpretant
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2.3.3. Limitations of Peirce’s Theory 
of Sign
Peirce’s account of sign, as any other theo-
ry, has certain limitations. 
Peirce’s account might not be viewed as 
a general theory of sign despite the fact that 
it is usually treated as the general one. Al-
though it is more general as compared, for 
example,	with	Saussure’s approach, over-
all	it	does	not	embrace	all	the	complexity	
of the phenomenon of sign. In particular, it 
does not give a behavioral account of sign 
(as Morris	and	Uexküll treated it). Peirce’s 
theory is essentially a mentalist one.
Peirce’s theory provides only a triadic 
model of sign; however, there can be other 
options, too. the triadicity is a ground of 
Peirce’s semiotics. His model is the same 
for the whole variety of signs. Different 
levels	of	sign	complexity	are	ignored.	Ad-
mitting the essentially triadic character 
of	 sign,	different	 levels	of	 its	 complexity	
should be employed; the model, hence, 
might be monadic, dyadic, triadic, etc. Hé-
bert (2006), in particular, singled out up to 
six	correlates	of	sign.	
Peirce	did	not	provide	a	clear	definition	
of sign in terms of being. He only claimed 
that sign should be viewed in terms of the 
category of thirdness. the latter, however, 
is a primary idea in his ontology and, there-
fore,	defined	only	in	a	descriptive	way.	
Peirce’s	classification	of	signs	does	not	
cover	all	the	complexity	of	the	idea	of	sign.	
The	definitions	of	some	types	of	signs	are	
deficient.	In	particular,	Peirce’s	classifica-
tion does not allow discriminating between 
the formal and the material signs.  
Peirce’s semiotics has only a limited 
productivity.	It	ends,	in	fact,	with	the	defi-
nition	 and	 classification	 of signs. It pro-
vides only a limited possibility to produce 
new semiotic constructions.
Despite its limitations, Peirce’s semi-
otics	remains	the	most	significant	modern	
contribution to the philosophical theory of 
sign. It is probably the best project of this 
kind, proposed so far.
2.4. Sign as Ontological  
Homomorphism
Homomorphism is the key idea and the 
main object of investigation of the present 
paper.
Homomorphism is a term of the Greek 
origin (homos means same, similar, and 
morphê means shape). Sign as homomor-
phism, therefore, etymologically is a sign 
defined	as	similarity,	resemblance	of	form.	
Not all signs can be viewed as homomor-
phisms; therefore, the term should be used 
to denote a class of signs. 
the term of homomorphism is used in 
various	domains	of	science,	and	its	defini-
tion	is	not	exactly	the	same.	Mathematics	
provides	its	strictest	definition.	In	semiot-
ics,	homomorphism	can	be	defined	in	two	
alternative ways (Figure 2): syntagmati-
cally, when one sign is viewed as a homo-
morphism of another one, and paradigmat-
ically, when a sign is viewed as a homo-
morphism	 of	 the	 signified	 object.	 In	 this	
paper, only the latter way is considered.
the term of homomorphism is rarely 
used in semiotics. Goguen (1999) and 
Harrell (Goguen & Harrell, 2003), in par-
ticular, considered syntagmatic homomor-
phism, whereas reichardt (2003) viewed 
paradigmatic homomorphism. 
the term sign as a homomorphism I 
will use interchangeably with the term ho-
momorphic sign.
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roots of the modern idea of homomor-
phism I trace back to Aristotle. I suggest 
grounding the idea of homomorphism in 
his theory of being. Hence, I will consider 
an	 ontologically	 defined	 homomorphism.	
I suggest shortly calling it an ontologi-
cal homomorphism. the latter, due to its 
grounding in the theory of being, is the 
most fundamental conception of homo-
morphism as compared to its other concep-
tions in sciences. 
3. sign and Aristotle’s  
theory of Being
the theory of being is chosen in this 
paper to ground the idea of sign. Its roots 
descend to the antiquity when the know-
ledge of reality was not split into thou-
sands of directions. Aristotle proposed one 
of	 the	most	 influential	accounts	of	being.	
It allows accounting for cognition as an 
ingredient part of reality. In particular, he 
provided an ontological account of the per-
ception used in this paper to introduce the 
sign as a homomorphism. 
3.1. On Application of Aristotle’s 
Theory of Being
Aristotle considered being in two different 
ways. In Categories, he treated it linguisti-
cally and gave a list of ten categories—the 
most general predicates describing being. 
In Metaphysics,	he	defined	being	ontologi-
cally, that is, being as being. the latter he 
accounted for in terms of two metaphysi-
cal principles—matter and form. the two 
terms	cannot	be	strictly	defined;	Aristotle	
chose hulê (it means wood in Greek and 
corresponds to matter in latin) to denote 
the	 first	 principle,	 and	 shape	 (morphê in 
Greek, form in latin) to denote the second 
one. His theory, accordingly, was denoted 
by a compound term hylomorphism—mat-
ter-formism (also spelled hylemorphism). 
It should be noted that the meaning of the 
form should not be limited to its geometri-
cal treatment as a shape. It may have many 
different interpretations; in particular, Ar-
istotle treated it also as a function when 
noting that vision is a form of the eye, as 
Green	described	(1998).	The	matter	might	
also be treated as the content. 
Figure 2. Homomorphism in semiotics. Illustration of difference between paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic definition of the semiotic homomorphism
Sign
Other sign
Paradigmatic 
homomorphism
Syntagmatic homomorphism
Syntagmatic axis
Signified object
Paradigmatic 
axis
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the form and matter as two primary 
ideas might be viewed as a binary principle 
for the articulation of being. the universal-
ity of the binary approach in the treatment 
of reality was also claimed by leibnitz. 
later, in the twentieth century, the binary 
principle was implemented in the funda-
mentals of information technologies.
The	 doctrine	 of	 hylomorphism	 flour-
ished until the renaissance. A similar idea 
of treating things as a conjunction of form 
and content is common in modern times. 
Some skeptics, however, acknowledge 
now only the historical value of hylomor-
phism.
For description of sign as a homomor-
phism, I take the basic idea of Aristotle to 
describe being in terms of form and matter. 
I do not consider deeper ideas—the pri-
mordial matter and the quantified matter 
(materia signata). I do not include paral-
lel ideas—actuality (actus) and potential-
ity (potentia)—in treating being; the latter 
two, together with form and matter, make 
the four causes of being in the theory of 
Aristotle. Actuality and potentiality allow 
defining	the	dynamical	aspect	of	being.	
Hence, I consider only the part of hylo-
morphism, necessary for the account of the 
homomorphic sign. A fuller scope of hylo-
morphism should be employed in further 
developments; analysis of actuality and 
potentiality, in particular, might be used 
for building dynamical models of sign and 
its interpretation.
I do not follow Aristotle literally. Some 
ideas of this paper probably cannot be rec-
onciled with Aristotle’s hylomorphism. 
the role of form and matter in treating in-
dividuation makes one of the main differ-
ences. My approach is closer to the one of 
Bonaventura	 and	 might	 be	 characterized	
as symmetric: I take matter and form as 
equally important parts in the individua-
tion of an object. 
essays of Aristotle on being, as any 
other ancient	 texts,	are	a	subject	of	 inter-
pretation. Now we have an opportunity 
to compare the ideas of Aristotle with the 
heritage of other philosophers and to place 
them	 in	 the	context	of	 contemporary	 sci-
ence. From my point of view, Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism might be viewed as a binary 
architecture of being—and of reality on the 
whole. Form and matter are the two prin-
ciples applied for the articulation of being. 
leibnitz later provided the mathematical 
description of the binary principle. In the 
twentieth century, the binary principle was 
implemented in the idea of information.
It might be added that in this paper Ar-
istotle’s hylomorphism is used as an alter-
native to the Peirce’s approach to being.
3.2. Aristotle’s Theory of Perception
I	will	 base	 the	definition	of	 sign	 in	Aris-
totle’s theory of perception; therefore, this 
theory should be described in brief. 
Aristotle based his account of percep-
tion and cognition on his theory of being. 
According to Aristotle, in perception, the 
form of a thing is abstracted (detached, 
separated) from the thing perceived. the 
perceiver in this way obtains ideas (forms) 
of things. the forms then are used in the 
mind of the perceiver instead of things: 
“….	it	is	not	the	stone	which	is	present	in	
the	soul,	but	its	form”	(On	the	Soul,	III,	8).	
this idea is sometimes termed as Aristo-
tle’s theory of abstraction. 
Aristotle illustrated his account of per-
ception by comparing it with an impres-
sion of a signet	 ring	 in	wax.	 In	his	essay	
On the Soul, he wrote: 
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“By	“sense”	is	meant	what	has	the	power	
of receiving into itself the sensible forms 
of things without matter. this must be con-
ceived as taking place in the way in which 
a	 piece	 of	 wax	 takes	 on	 the	 impress	 of	 a	
signet-ring without iron or gold; we say that 
what produces the impression is a signet of 
bronze or gold, but its particular metallic 
substance makes no difference: in a similar 
way, a sense is affected by what is coloured 
or	flavoured,	or	sounding,	but	it	is	indiffer-
ent to what in each case the substance is; 
what only matters is the quality it has, i.e. 
in	what	ratio	its	constituents	are	combined”	
(II, 12). 
Aristotle did not propose a full theory 
of	 sign.	Barnouw noticed that the theory 
might have been grounded in the account 
of perception (reynolds, 2006): 
“Aristotle himself could have avoided the 
deficiency	 if	 he	had	developed	more	 com-
pletely his theory of sign and had connected 
it to his analysis of perception (p. 99). 
An attempt to ground the sign in Aris-
totle’s theory of perception is made in this 
paper.
4. definition of the signified object
Semiotics	usually	starts	with	the	definition	
of sign. the signified object, however, is a 
more primary idea, and therefore it should 
be	defined	first.	
The	 definition	 of	 the	 object	 is	 not	 a	
simple problem in philosophy. King (2000) 
described the general problem of object-
hood. He noted, in particular, that a great 
part	 of	modern	 science	 defines	 an	 object	
as a set of properties. this mechanistic ap-
proach prevailed during the last centuries 
and provided a powerful tool for sciences; 
its usefulness for semiotics, however, is 
not evident. I will demonstrate here that an 
alternative approach, based on hylomor-
phism, might be a more appropriate one. 
I start from describing the place of the ob-
ject in philosophy and semiotics. 
4.1. Object in Semiotics  
and Philosophy
The	 signified	object	 in	 semiotics	 is	 often	
viewed	as	a	primary	idea	requiring	no	defi-
nition. 
Pierce did not focus his attention on 
the	definition	of	the	object	and	simply	de-
scribed	it	as	follows:	“By	an	object,	I	mean	
anything that we can think of, i.e. anything 
we	can	talk	about.”	(Peirce, not dated).
Generally, the object in semiotics is 
usually viewed in relation to the perceiver; 
then it might be termed a perceived object 
(see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Object in the scheme of perception, 
viewed from the point of view of semiotics
the treatment of the object in semiotics 
cannot	be	separated	from	its	wider	context.	
In the theory of knowledge, the object is 
treated as an object known to its knower. 
In phenomenology, the object is viewed in 
relation to the intentional act; the latter is 
considered as directedness of the subject 
toward the object.
4.2. Hylomorphic Definition  
of the Object
The	object	can	be	defined	using	the	hylo-
morphic approach as a conjunction of its 
form and matter. 
Perception
Perceived  
objectPerceiver
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Considering the relation between form 
and matter, Aquinas in Summa Theologi-
ca2 notes that matter in determining a par-
ticular thing	 is	made	 finite	 by	 form,	 and	
vice versa: 
“Now	matter	 is	 in	a	way	made	finite	by	
form, and the form by matter. Matter, indeed, 
is	made	finite	by	form,	inasmuch	as	matter,	
before it receives its form, is in potentiality 
of many forms; but on receiving a form, it is 
terminated	by	it.	Again,	form	is	made	finite	
by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in 
itself, is common to many objects; but when 
embodied in matter, a form is ascribed to this 
particular	thing”	(ST,	part	1,	q.7,	a.	1).
I suggest viewing the object in terms of 
individuation. Aristotle and Aquinas con-
sidered only one component (matter) as 
the principle of individuation. According 
to the approach of this paper, I will fol-
low	Bonaventure’s approach based on two 
ideas—form and matter. He described how 
the individuality of a thing emerges from 
the conjunction of its form and matter: 
“Individuation	 arises	 from	 the	 actual	
conjunction of matter with form, and from 
this conjunction each appropriates the other 
to itself—just as it is clear that when an im-
pression	or	stamping	of	many	seals	on	wax	
which previously was one takes place, nei-
ther the seals can be made many without the 
wax,	nor	is	the	wax	enumerated	except	be-
cause diverse seals come about in it. Still, if 
you	were	to	ask	from	which	[individuation]	
comes principally, it should be stated that 
an individual is a this-something. that it is 
this, it has more principally from the matter, 
by reason of which the form has a location 
in space and time. that it is something, it 
has from the form. An individual has be-
ing	(esse)	and	also	has	existence	(existere).	
Matter	gives	existence	to	the	form,	but	form	
2 An abbreviation St for Summa Theologica is fur-
ther used. Description of the works by Aquinas is pro-
vided in the list of references.
gives actual being (actum essendi) to the 
matter. therefore, in the case of creatures, 
individuation arises from a double principle 
(Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 3 pars 1 art. 2 q. 3 
resp. (Vol. II, 109b—110a), as cited in King, 
2000).
Bonaventure’s idea on individuation 
visually might be presented as shown in 
Figure	4.	
Figure 4. Visual presentation of 
Bonaventure’s approach to the individuation 
of a particular thing treated as a conjunction 
of its form (something) and matter (this) 
Matter
Particular  
thing
This
Form
Something
5. the cartesian system and  
determination of the signified 
object
the described philosophical account of in-
dividuation gives only general guidelines 
for	the	definition	of	the	object.	For	its	more	
detailed account, I suggest employing the 
system of Cartesian coordinates. Further, I 
will also use it as the major tool in describ-
ing models of sign in this paper.
5.1. The Cartesian System for Being
In Discourse on Method, Descartes	(1637)	
proposed a coordinate system for space 
(see Figure 5). the system introduced 
quantitative relations into geometry. It 
proved to be a powerful tool for mathemat-
ics, physics and other domains of science 
during the last few centuries. there were 
also attempts to use it in semiotics; Marti-
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nelli	(2008),	in	particular,	used	it	to	articu-
late the idea of musical authenticity.
royce (1951) suggested that a point in 
the space might be treated in terms of in-
dividuation. the Cartesian system, hence, 
might be viewed as a tool for the individu-
ation of points in space. 
I suggest applying the Cartesian sys-
tem for the articulation of being. Matter 
and	 form	 might	 be	 viewed	 as	 two	 axes,	
and their intersection makes the system 
of coordinates (see Figure 6). the pair of 
form and matter then makes an entity (be-
ing). the system should be treated in terms 
of structure, and not quantity. the arrows 
on	 its	 axes	 indicate	 only	 the	 presence	 or	
privation of form or matter, respectively. 
that is, they do not imply any quantitative 
relations, such as more or less of form and 
matter.
the numbering of the quadrants might 
naturally start from the one determined by 
the presence of matter and the privation of 
form (see Figure 6). Such order implies 
that matter is viewed as an initial mode in 
determining being. Another order might 
also be used and grounded ontologically. 
the term privation needs an additional 
explanation.	 Privation	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	
absence. Aristotle	 gave	 the	 following	ex-
ample: a blind man has a privation of the 
ability to see. It cannot be said that a stone 
has the privation of vision, because it has 
no eyes. It should be noted that Aristo-
tle and Aquinas used it only in relation to 
form, but not matter. Privation of matter is 
also considered in this paper.
the described system of coordinates 
for being might also be called the system 
of ontological or hylomorphic coordi-
nates. these terms further will be used in-
terchangeably. 
5.2. Determination of the Top-level 
Modes of Being
the system of coordinates for being can 
be used to determine the most general 
modes of being and relations among them 
(Budrevičius,	 2006).	 The	 thing	 is	 one	 of	
them. It will be used further as a ground 
for	the	definition	of	object. 
the intersection of matter and form 
axes	 in	 the	 system	of	ontological	 coordi-
nates creates four corresponding quadrants. 
each of them is determined as a compound 
of form, matter or their corresponding pri-
vations. each quadrant can be interpreted 
Figure 5. The Cartesian coordinate system 
for space
Individual, 
point (x, y)
II I
III IV
Y
-X
-Y
X
Figure 6. The coordinate system for being
III II
IV I
Form
Privation 
of matter
Privation 
of form
Matter
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as a basic mode of being as shown in 
Figure	7.	
The	 first	 mode	 corresponds	 to	 the	
thing—a compound of form and matter. 
It	occupies	the	first	quadrant	and	presents	
a fully determined being. the other three 
modes are not fully determined (or fully 
undetermined), because they lack either 
form or matter, or both. In our common 
language, we denote the partly determined 
modes by the word something; its relation 
with the thing can be more clearly seen 
by spelling it as some-thing. the latter 
is either an immaterial some-thing when 
it corresponds to the mode determined 
by the presence of form and privation of 
matter, or a material some-thing when it 
is determined by the privation of form 
and presence of matter. the fully unde-
termined mode may be termed as nothing 
(no-thing), because it is described in terms 
of the privation of both form and matter. It 
should be noted that the words something 
and nothing might also be interpreted in 
a different way; here, I gave only one of 
their natural meanings.
5.3. Determination of the Object
the above system of coordinates for being 
might be used for the determination of the 
object. 
I suggest viewing the object as an indi-
viduated thing. For this purpose, I suggest 
applying the earlier described approach of 
Bonaventura	to	individuation.	A	particular	
thing	then	can	be	defined	as	a	conjunction	
of concrete matter and concrete form cre-
ating	 its	 individuality	(see	Figure	8).	The	
object then might be viewed as a particu-
lar thing or, more generally, as a class of 
particular things. In the latter case, a set 
of matter and form pairs would be em-
ployed. 
Figure 7. Presentation of the top-level modes 
of being in the system of hylomorphic  
coordinates
Privation of 
matter
Form
Matter
Privation 
of form
Some-thing 
immaterial
Thing
No-thing Some-thing 
material
Figure 8. Individuation of the object  
considered in terms of the system  
of ontological coordinates
Matter
Form
Object
It should be noted that the system of 
ontological coordinates introduced in this 
paper provides only a structural but not 
quantitative individuation of the object; 
the Cartesian system for space provides a 
quantitative individuation. 
the determination of the object might 
be	viewed	as	a	final	result	in	the	sequence	
of determinations started from the two 
metaphysical principles—form and mat-
ter. the latter might be viewed as deter-
minants, or constituents, of determination. 
the sequence of determinations is summa-
rized in table 1. 
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5.4. Evaluation of the System  
of Ontological Coordinates 
the introduced system of ontological coor-
dinates will be used as the main instrument 
for developing the models of sign in this 
paper; therefore, its peculiarities should be 
analyzed in more detail. 
5.4.1. Being as Transcendence and  
a System of Ontological Coordinates 
the introduced system of ontological co-
ordinates discriminates among four modes 
of being. the discrimination might seem 
to create a contradiction if being is treated 
as a transcendental idea: the latter cannot 
be logically divided. Harper	 (1879)	 puts	
it	as	follows:	“You	can	never	escape	from	
being within the sphere of reality: yet be-
ing	 cannot	 be	 its	 own	 divisor”	 (Chapter	
II, Prolegomenon I). there is no contra-
diction, however, because the coordinate 
system does not divide being; it only de-
fines	 its	 different	 determinations.	 Harper	
describes determinations of being in the 
following way: 
“Nevertheless,	Being	admits	of	what	may	
be	 called	 classifications;	 and	 these	 quasi 
classifications	are	called	its	determinations. 
But	why?	Because	one	and	the	same	object	
is	more	clearly	defined,	or	rather	determined,	
by the representative presence of additional 
notes or determining forms”	(ibid.).
this quotation also shows that forms 
can be a means for the determination of 
being. It might be added that, according 
to the approach of present paper, matter is 
also used as a determining factor. 
5.4.2. Limitations of the System  
of Ontological Coordinates 
the system of coordinates allows present-
ing only a static view of being. the latter 
might be termed Cartesian being, taking 
into account its basis—the Cartesian sys-
tem of coordinates. treated in terms of 
structure, the system gives only a logical 
projection of being. More profound logical 
means should be used to treat being more 
fully, including its dynamical aspect. log-
ic, overall, cannot fully describe being; it 
is incapable of treating being as a transcen-
dental idea. It should be noted that the Car-
tesian system of coordinates for space has 
similar limitations: it does not fully present 
the idea of Space and gives only its logical 
(and quantitative) projection. 
the proposed system of coordinates 
is	 insufficient	 for	 the	 definition	 of	 sign,	
Table 1. Sequence of determination of being from indetermination to object
No. Determinants Description result
1. Form or matter Indetermination Material or formal indetermination
2. Form and matter Determination of being 
generally 
thing, being in general
3. Substantial form and 
matter
Individuation according 
to	Bonaventura
Particular thing 
Form, matter, and their 
corresponding privations
Determination of 
being by means of the 
system of ontological 
coordinates
Object, particular thing, and three 
partially determined entities
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because it allows determining only non-
relational	being;	 the	 latter	 is	defined	as	a	
conjunction of form and matter and does 
not depend on any other being. the sign, 
however, stands for something else; there-
fore, it is a relational being. Further, I will 
demonstrate	that	for	the	definition	of	sign,	
three components (one form and two in-
stances of matter) are necessary. Corre-
spondingly, a more advanced system of 
coordinates should be used.
Despite the described limitations, the 
proposed combination of Aristotle’s hylo-
morphism and the Cartesian system of co-
ordinates gives a new and productive idea. 
the latter still might be viewed as an on-
tological construction. It partly retains the 
philosophical depth of Aristotle’s theory, 
but also it possesses the logical strictness 
of the Cartesian system of coordinates. 
6. derivation of the model of sign 
as Indeterminate homomorphism
6.1. Rationale
I suggest using the following rationale 
to derive the model of sign as homomor-
phism. 
Aristotle’s account of the perception 
described earlier in this paper will be em-
ployed. Aristotle compared perception 
with	 the	 process	 when	 “a	 piece	 of	 wax	
takes	on	the	impress	of	a	signet	ring”	(On 
the Soul, II, 12). In terms of hylomorphism, 
the process might be described as follows: 
the	wax	 takes	 on	 the	 form	 of	 the	 signet.	
the signet ring is meant for making signs; 
therefore, it is natural to view its impress 
in	the	wax	as	a	sign.	Three	related	compo-
nents of sign might be singled out in this 
situation: the signet ring with an embossed 
image	as	the	signified	object,	the	lump	of	
wax	as	the	medium	for	presenting	the	sign,	
and	 the	 impress	 of	 the	 signet	 in	 the	wax	
as the sign itself. the model of sign will 
be viewed in terms of the superimposition 
of	 the	 signified	object	 (i.e.	 the	 signet)	on	
the	 medium	 (i.e.	 the	 lump	 of	 wax).	 The	
system of hylomorphic coordinates will be 
employed for considering the model. the 
components of sign will be presented using 
separate systems of coordinates. the sign, 
however, is an indivisible being; therefore, 
all components of the sign further should 
be presented in one system of coordinates. 
It will be shown that the homomor-
phism under consideration should be 
called indeterminate, because the relation 
between	the	signified	object	and	the	sign	is	
not	explicitly	considered	in	its	model.
6.2. Model of the Signified Object
The	signet	and	the	lump	of	wax	might	be	
viewed as two particular things (individual 
entities). For concreteness, I will consider 
a signet made of gold with the embossed 
image of a crown on it (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9. The signet as an object presented in 
the system of ontological coordinates
The	 lump	 of	 wax	 is	 also	 a	 particular	
thing, and it can be determined similarly, 
as Figure 10 illustrates.
Form: crown
Matter: gold
Signet 
(crown)
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In the above situation of the sign, the 
signet	is	the	signified	object,	and	the	lump	
of	wax	 is	 the	medium	(or	vehicle)	 for	 the	
presentation of the sign; therefore, in terms 
of being, they should be treated differently. 
6.3. Model of the Sign Medium 
I suggest viewing the difference between 
the	 sign	medium	and	 the	 signified	object	
in terms of subordination in being: the me-
dium should be viewed as a subordinate 
being	in	relation	to	the	signified	object.	It	
should be noted, however, that the medi-
um—the	 lump	 of	 wax—is	 subordinated	
to the signet in relation only to its form, 
but	not	matter,	because	wax	loses	its	form	
while presenting the sign, but its matter re-
mains	 the	 same.	The	wax,	 therefore,	 is	 a	
material medium used for the presentation 
of sign. 
the situation can be described more 
strictly in terms of the system of ontologi-
cal coordinates. the relation of subordina-
tion	 existing	 in	 the	 system	might	 be	 em-
ployed for this purpose. the relation, in 
particular,	exists	between	the	first	and	the	
second quadrant: the second quadrant is 
subordinated	 to	 the	first	one,	because	 the	
second quadrant has a privation of matter, 
while	 the	 first	 one	 has	 both	 components	
(form and matter). On this ground, a thing, 
technically, can be transformed into a me-
dium	by	means	of	moving	it	from	the	first	
quadrant into the second one. Graphically, 
this transformation can be implemented 
by rotating the system of coordinates as 
shown in Figure 11. 
6.4. Sign as a Superimposition of the 
Signified Object on the Sign Medium 
According	to	the	earlier	defined	rationale,	
model of sign can be viewed in terms of 
superimposition of the system of ontologi-
cal	coordinates	for	the	signified	object	(i.e.	
Figure 10. The lump of wax as a particular 
thing presented in the system of ontological 
coordinates
Form of the wax: lump
Lump 
of wax
Matter: wax
Figure 11. Transformation of a thing into a medium by rotating the system of ontological  
coordinates; an example: a) wax as a particular thing; b) wax as a subordinate particular 
thing (the medium) 
Wax as a  
particular thing
180º
Form
b)a)
Matter Matter
Form
Wax as a medium
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the signet) on the subordinated system 
for	 the	medium	 (i.e.	 the	 lump	 of	wax	 as	
medium). Graphically, the process of su-
perimposition is illustrated in Figure 12. 
Its result is a compound of two dissimilar 
instances of matter and one common form 
(see Figure 13). I suggest viewing the re-
sult as a complex being. Some Aristotle’s 
commentators use the term conformity (or 
conformality) to denote the common form. 
A	complex	being	then	might	be	called	con-
formism; this term, however, has another 
connotation; therefore, I propose using the 
term homomorphism, which has the Greek 
origin. I suggest calling its graphical pre-
sentation an ontological (or hylomorphic) 
diagram of homomorphism. 
The	following	definition	of	sign	can	be	
formulated now, using the idea of homo-
morphism: Sign is a being that has its own 
matter and the form of the signified object, 
but it has no matter of the object.
7. Intentional determination  
of Being and sign
the described model of homomorphism is 
based on the idea of the similarity of form 
and dissimilarity of matter. this basis, how-
ever, does not provide a full determination 
of homomorphism, because the direction 
of	representation	is	not	explicitly	defined.	
It should be noted that the terms signified 
object and sign, used in the description of 
sign as a homomorphism, naturally imply 
the	 existence	of	 the	direction	of	determi-
nation. to make the model of homomor-
phism more precise, the direction should 
be	made	explicit.	
there can be two directions of deter-
mination. I will analyze them, taking for 
illustration again Aristotle’s account of 
perception. 
Figure 12. Superimposition of the system 
of ontological coordinates for the signified 
object (signet) on the subordinated system of 
coordinates for the medium (wax)
Common 
(similar) form
Crown
Impress 
(sign)
Gold
Wax
Crown
Signet
Dissimilar matter
the described homomorphism should 
be called indeterminate, because the re-
lation	 between	 the	 signified	 object	 and	
the	sign	is	not	explicitly	considered	in	its	
model.
Figure 13. Ontological diagram of  
indeterminate homomorphism. Two opposite 
arrows on the axis of abscissa indicate  
the dissimilarity of matter of the signified 
object and of the sign
Form
ObjectImpress 
(sign)
MatterMatter
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7.1. Physical Determination  
and the Sign
Aristotle compared perception with a phys-
ical	process	when	“a	piece	of	wax	takes	on	
the	impress	of	a	signet	ring”	(On the Soul, 
II,	12).	The	impress	in	the	wax,	hence,	is	
made	by	exerting	a	physical	 force	on	 the	
signet. the force is directed from the sig-
net	 (object)	 toward	 the	wax;	 the	 result	 is	
an	 impress	 in	 the	wax—a	sign.	 I	 suggest	
calling it a physical sign. Its ontological 
diagram	is	shown	in	Figure	14.	
physical world and sciences (Naturwissen-
schaften). 
It is not common to consider physical 
processes in semiotics. Nevertheless, I 
propose including the analysis of physical 
sign into the scope of semiotics. Such type 
of sign also might be called a mark. Here, 
I have considered only one type of physi-
cal signs – a physical sign as a homomor-
phism.
 
7.2. Intentional Determination  
of the Sign
Generally, Aristotle viewed cognition as a 
process directed from the subject toward 
the object. the directedness from the sub-
ject toward the object in contemporary cog-
nitive science and philosophy is viewed in 
terms of intentionality. Sense perception, 
as a lower grade of cognition, can also be 
viewed using the idea of intentionality. 
Sign as a homomorphism is based on the 
process of perception; therefore, it also can 
be viewed in terms of intentionality. Such 
a sign then should be called an intentional 
sign; it implements intentionality as the 
directedness from the sign (perceiver) to-
ward	the	signified	object	(see	Figure	15).
Figure 14. Ontological diagram of physical 
sign as homomorphism 
A physical sign is an objective sign 
causally	 related	 to	 the	 signified	object.	 It	
does not depend on its perceiver; therefore, 
the term of an objective perceiver or an ob-
server is more suitable in this situation. 
A physical sign as a homomorphism 
might be also described in semantic terms. 
In hermeneutics, Dilthey proposed dis-
criminating between understanding (ver-
stehen) and explanation (erklaeren) as two 
types	 of	 interpretation	 (Dilthey,	 1989).	
the physical sign then should be treated 
in	terms	of	explanation.	The	phenomenon	
of understanding belongs to the mental 
world and humanities (Geisteswissen-
schaften),	while	explanation	belongs	to	the	
Form
ObjectSign
MatterMatter
Force
Figure 15. Ontological diagram  
of intentional sign as homomorphism.  
The arrow from sign toward object indicates 
intentionality as directedness
Form
ObjectSign
Matter of objectMatter of sign
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I suggest viewing intentionality as the 
key idea	 in	 defining	 sign	 as	 a	 homomor-
phism. It also determines the type of its 
meaning: the latter may accordingly be 
termed as an immediate, direct, literal, ref-
erential, partially deliberate, partially sub-
jective, etc. 
8. sign as homomorphism  
in the context of Peirce’s semiotics
In the beginning of this paper, I have pro-
vided a short overview of semiotic re-
search related to the theories of sign. Now, 
approaching its end, I have a possibility to 
make the relation more concrete. 
In this chapter, I shortly compare the 
model of sign as a homomorphism with 
Pierce’s idea of sign.  
8.1. Differences from Peirce’s  
Approach
the described idea of sign as a homomor-
phism	differs	significantly	from	the	one	of	
Pierce’s. Nevertheless, there are also cer-
tain similarities. Here, I shortly analyze 
three aspects in the treatment of sign: rela-
tion to being, subjectivity versus objectiv-
ity, and interpretation of sign. 
Sign as a homomorphism, similarly as 
Peirce’s	sign,	is	defined	in	terms	of	being.	
Approaches to the treatment of being, how-
ever, differ	significantly.	Peirce	treats	it	in	
terms of his universal categories; in this 
paper, being is treated in terms of Aristo-
tle’s theory (more precisely, the latter has 
been	modified	 as	 described	 earlier	 in	 this	
paper). 
Peirce treats being and sign in terms 
of subjective experience, as it can be con-
cluded,	for	example,	from	his	seminal	pa-
per What is a sign? Intentional sign as a 
homomorphism in this paper is also viewed 
in terms of subjectively treated being. the 
physical sign as a homomorphism, however, 
is viewed in terms of the objectively treated 
being.	Hence,	the	approach	to	the	definition	
of sign in this paper encompasses both its 
subjective and objective treatments. 
Sign as a homomorphism has no com-
ponent corresponding to Peirce’s inter-
pretant. Strictly speaking, sign as a ho-
momorphism is a non-interpreted sign. It 
encompasses only an immediate meaning; 
the latter might be viewed as an interpreta-
tion of the signified object. 
8.2. Relation to Peirce’s  
Classification of Signs
Sign as a homomorphism is based on its 
relation	with	the	signified	object;	therefore,	
it might be compared to the sign viewed 
table 2. The place of sign as homomorphism in Peirce’s classification
Category II. Of relation to object
Degree of 
similarity
Similarity of form: 
homomorphism
Similarity of matter: 
homomaterialism
Firstness Highest Formal icon (e.g., photo) Material icon (e.g., idol)
Secondness Medium Formal	index	(e.g.,	‘M’	as	
size of dress) 
Material	index	(e.g.,	
weathervane, smoke)
thirdness lowest (no 
similarity)
Formal symbol (e.g., @ ) Material symbol (e.g., 
wedding ring)
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in relation to the object in Peirce’s clas-
sification.	 Each	 sign	 in	 the	 classification	
should be split into a pair of the sign of 
form and the sign of matter; sign as a ho-
momorphism then might be compared (see 
table 2) with the sign of form, and sign as 
homomaterialism, accordingly, might be 
viewed as its counterpart. Hence, instead 
of	 one	 index	 in	 the	 classification,	 there	
should	be	 a	pair	 of	 the	 formal	 index	 and	
the	material	index;	similarly,	there	should	
be pairs of the formal and material sym-
bols and icons, respectively.
9. conclusions
the present paper demonstrates that the 
basic ideas of Aristotle’s theory of being 
and cognition can be used in developing 
the theory of sign. the sign, as well as oth-
er aspects of reality, can be treated in terms 
of form and matter (content). Aristotle’s 
theory of form and matter is further devel-
oped	and	modified	by	means	of	merging	it	
with the logic of the system of Cartesian 
coordinates. the latter introduces more 
strictness in the articulation of being, treat-
ed in terms of hylomorphism. limitations 
of the merging are discussed. A model of 
the ontological diagram is proposed on the 
basis of a conjunction of Aristotle’s and 
Descartes’s ideas. It allows constructing 
and presenting model of sign in a new way, 
which is stricter than the graphical means 
traditionally used in semiotics (e.g., sign 
triangle). 
the proposed account of sign shows 
that	 all	 its	 ingredients—the	 signified	 ob-
ject, the sign medium, and the sign itself—
can be derived using elementary ontologi-
cal ideas. No other theory in semiotics pro-
vides such a possibility. 
The	 following	 general	 definition	 of	
sign as (ontological) homomorphism is 
proposed:
Sign	 is	 a	 complex	mode	 of	 being,	1. 
resulting from the composition of 
two	 simple	 modes—the	 signified	
object and the sign medium, both 
consisting of their own form and 
matter. 
Sign should be considered in terms 2. 
of three ontological components: 
two instances of dissimilar matter 
and one form which is common 
(similar)	for	the	signified	object	and	
for the medium. 
A sign as a homomorphism is an inten-
tional being for its perceiver. Intentionality 
should be viewed as one of the key ideas in 
the theory of sign. 
the proposed model of sign has certain 
limitations. Firstly, it considers sign only 
in terms of form, leaving aside its alterna-
tive—matter. A model of sign as a similar-
ity of matter should also be developed as 
a counterpart for the sign as a homomor-
phism.
Another important limitation of the pro-
posed account of sign is related to the aspi-
ration to treat the phenomenon of sign by 
using only two principles of being—form 
and matter. they present only the static 
aspect of Aristotle’s theory. Correspond-
ingly,	 they	could	explain	only	 static	phe-
nomena in semiotics. In particular, form 
and matter directly are not applicable and 
insufficient	as	the	basis	for	the	account	of	
the behavioral aspect of sign. limitations 
related to statics, however, might be over-
come by supplementing the theory with 
two other principles of Aristotle’s hylo-
morphism, namely the actus and potentia, 
implementing the dynamical aspect of be-
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ing. It should be also noted that Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism has its limitations. they 
were not analyzed, because the purpose of 
this paper is not the analysis and evalua-
tion of Aristotle’s theory. 
the results of this paper might be re-
garded as a little step towards developing 
a strict and precise general quantitative 
theory of sign. 
Overall, this paper might be considered 
as a description of an earlier unnoticed path 
toward developing a fundamental theory 
of sign. the path is rooted in antiquity. In-
sights into Aristotle’s account of being and 
cognition allowed uncovering the path. 
the undertaken approach, however, was 
not limited to philosophy. the application 
of the Cartesian system allowed describing 
the sign in a stricter and more precise way. 
this paper, therefore, might be regarded as 
an attempt to introduce the methodology 
of	exact	sciences	into	semiotics.	
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Pagrindinis	šio	straipsnio	tyrimo	dalykas	yra	ženklas	
kaip	žymimojo	objekto	homomorfizmas	–	tai	yra	žen-
klas kaip formos panašumas. Pagrindinis tikslas – su-
kurti	ženklo	kaip	homomorfizmo	modelį,	kuris	būtų	
griežtos,	 pamatinės	 ženklo	 teorijos	 pradinė	 dalis.	
Daug	 įvairių	 ženklų	 gali	 būti	 nagrinėjami	kaip	 ho-
momorfizmai:	 fotografijos,	 paveikslai,	 skulptūros,	
diagramos,	 žemėlapiai	 ir	 kt.	 Pasiūlytas	 homomor-
finio	 ženklo	 modelis	 išvestas	 naudojant	 Aristotelio	
esaties	 teoriją.	 Kaip	 elementariosios	 sąvokos	 jame	
naudojami du Aristotelio esaties teorijos principai – 
ARIstotElIo EsAtIEs tEoRIjos sEmIotInės ĮŽVAlgos
Algirdas Budrevičius
S a n t r a u k a
forma	 ir	 materija	 (medžiaga).	 Dėstomo	 požiūrio	
ypatumas	semiotikos	atžvilgiu	yra	tas,	kad	ženklas	
ir	 žymimasis	 objektas	 traktuojami	 kaip	 išvestinės	
sąvokos;	jos	konstruojamos	kaip	formos	ir	materi-
jos	 junginiai.	Siekiant,	kad	modelis	būtų	griežtes-
nis,	 jam	 sudaryti	 naudojama	 Dekarto	 koordinačių	
sistema, pritaikyta esaties artikuliavimui. Homomor-
finio	ženklo	apibrėžimo	kertine	laikoma	intenciona-
lumo	sąvoka.	Straipsnyje	pateiktas	požiūris	į	ženklo	
apibrėžimą	gali	būti	laikomas	ontologine	alternatyva	
Peirce’o	požiūriui.
